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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As explained in the opening briefs, Granite School District (hereafter "Granite") 
and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (hereafter the "Church") are the real parties in economic interest in this case. 
Due to differences in laws and circumstances, each party is filing a separate brief, even 
though the Utah State Tax Commission (hereafter the "Commission") filed a single 
answering brief. The Church joins in the Argument portion of Granite's brief. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Commission's statement of the issues is incomplete and incorrect. It is 
incomplete because there are several sub-issues relevant to the final determination of 
Arco's liability. It is incorrect in that the Commission specifically assessed a Use Tax, 
not a Sales Tax or a Sales and Use Tax. Since these distinctions are relevant to the 
argument, Arco urges this Court to use Arco's statement of the issues. 
REPLY TO THE DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The Commission has omitted important statutes and administrative rules which 
show that the Decision below is not supported by current law. Arco requests the 
Court to accept the more complete list of authorities provided in the Opening Brief. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission's statement of the case assumes at least one of the issues in 
dispute on this appeal. Arco's contract with Interwest and Interwest's contract with the 
Church contained "furnish and install" language, but were at most conditional furnish 
and install contracts since they also contained a right for the Church to elect to 
purchase and supply some of the materials. The parties expected that this option 
would be exercised, and it was. After exercise of the Church's option, the contract was 
an "install only" contract with respect to these materials. Again, Arco urges this Court 
to accept Arco's more complete statement of the case. 
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Commission's Statement of Facts is incomplete. Since the Commission did 
not challenge any of Arco's original Statement of Facts, and Arco's Statement is 
supported by references to undisputed portions of the record, Arco urges the Court to 
refer to Arco's more complete Statement of Facts in reviewing this case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission does not have any greater expertise than this Court in 
interpreting statutes which have a clear legislative purpose and which involve questions 
previously settled by this Court, and therefore the proper standard of review is 
correction of error. However, the Decision below cannot be sustained under any 
standard because it contravenes legislative intent, prior holdings of this Court, and the 
language of the statute, and is inconsistent both internally and as applied. 
The Commission has mischaracterized this case as involving interpretation of an 
exemption when the Taxpayer (Arco) is not entitled to (and does not claim) any 
exemption. In fact, the Commission is attempting to broaden the long-established 
scope of the Use Tax so that it is additive to the Sales Tax rather than complementary 
and no longer limited to the narrow scope intended by the legislature. To support this 
admitted change of policy, which was argued for below on the grounds of a need for 
more revenue, the Commission has made numerous errors in legal analysis, including: 
(1) inconsistent statements of law (e.g., assessing Arco for some, but not all, of the 
materials which the Church purchased and Arco attached to the realty; and stating first 
that the contractor and then the subcontractor should be liable for the tax as the 
installer); (2) reliance on a property tax decision and out-of-state decisions interpreting 
vastly different statutes while disregarding the full standards set by those courts; (3) 
adding words to the definition of "use" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14); (4) ignoring 
its own Administrative Rules regarding the scope of the religious and charitable 
exemption and the means for determining the purchaser when applying the 
governmental exemption; and (5) ignoring well-settled principles of contract law such as 
the course of dealing between the parties and the standards of practice in the industry. 
Finally, the Commission discriminates unreasonably by applying its new policy 
retroactively even though it has applied similar changes to other entities prospectively. 
Based on any of these errors, the Decision below must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS CORRECTION OF ERROR 
The Commission relies on Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) to claim that this Court must review 
the Commission's Decision under the intermediate standard of reasonableness, rather 
than correction of error, saying: "The Morton court has provided guidance by stating, 
'fi]n the absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the specific question in 
issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a policy 
determination.'" (Tax Commission Brief "T.C.Br." at 16:, emphasis added.) The 
Commission then asserts that no legislative intent can be gleaned from the language of 
the statute itself, so the deferential standard of review is required. (Id. at 16-17.) 
The Commission's reliance upon Morton is erroneous for two fundamental 
reasons. First, the Commission ignores the basic reason given in Morton to justify 
applying an intermediate standard. In that case the Court explained: 
Rather, what has developed as the dispositive factor is whether the agency, by 
virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better position than the courts to give 
effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved. We have stated: "We do not 
defer to the Commission when construing statutory terms or when applying 
statutory terms to the facts unless the construction of the statutory language or 
the application of the law to the facts should be subject to the Commissions's 
expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical, first-hand experience with the 
subject matter." (Bennett v. Indus. Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986)) 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 586, emphasis added. 
Here, as the Commission concedes in its brief, "[t]he decision hinges on . . . 
conclusions of law reached by the Commission." (T.C.Br, at 19.) More specifically, the 
Commission's Decision turns on its conclusion that "conversion of tangible personal 
property into real property is deemed to be the consumption or use of the tangible 
personal property, which is the taxable event." (T.C.Br, at 25 quoting Gen. Docs. R. 93, 
emphasis added.) This conclusion in turn depends for its validity on (1) the scope of 
the rule created by this court in Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 
Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942);1 and (2) whether attachment of Church-owned 
1
 This case also involves Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S, but that rule was adopted as a 
codification of Utah Concrete, and thus the rule does not represent an independent 
determination of the Tax Commission entitled to separate deference. 
personalty to realty by a non-owner is a taxable "use" of the property contrary to the 
holdings of this court in Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 
152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 
P.2d 208 (1949),2 as well as the recent determination of this Court in Union Pacific 
Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv.Rep. 13 (Nov. 6, 1992). 
The Commission cannot seriously argue that it has special expertise in interpreting 
Supreme Court decisions and that this Court should therefore defer to such expertise. 
Thus, the Commission's opinion is entitled to no deference. See also Hales Sand & 
Gravel v. State Tax Commission, 200 Utah Adv.Rep. 3 (Nov. 12, 1992), fn. 3 at 7-8. 
Second, contrary to the Commission's claim, there is clear legislative intent 
regarding the intended scope of the Use Tax, which is the true issue involved.3 The 
statute itself, Section 59-12-103, as enacted by the legislature plainly assesses the tax 
against the "purchaser." Arco was not the purchaser. In Section 59-12-102(14)(a), the 
legislature defined "use" to require ownership (or a leasehold interest). Moreover, this 
2
 The Tax Commission cites decisions from other states to distinguish these and other cases, 
claiming that what Geneva called a holding is mere dicta. (T.C. Brief at 26-28.) However, this 
Court can determine for itself what weight to give its own pronouncements. The Tax 
Commission's additional suggestion that these cases are irrelevant because they were decided 
before the 1987 unification of the Sales Tax Act and the Use Tax Act (T.C. Brief at 26-27) is 
erroneous for two reasons. First, this Court has already held that the separate taxes were to be 
construed as if they were a single act, and thus the law change merely conformed the structure 
of the statute to its pre-existing interpretation. If such change has any significance at all, it is 
to reinforce legislative approval of this Court's prior interpretations. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 
530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). Second, the restructuring of the tax provisions in 1987 has no 
effect on this case, because all of the taxes assessed in this case were for periods which predate 
the Sales and Use Tax consolidation which became effective July 1, 1987. 
3
 The Tax Commission's decision specifically assessed a Use Tax and not a Sales Tax 
against Arco. The correct scope of that tax is discussed below. 
Court's opinions in Geneva and Union Portland Cement expressly declared that the 
legislative intent behind the Use Tax prohibited applying a Use Tax to materials 
purchased in Utah.4 The Court again referred to the intent of the legislature in Union 
Pacific. Since a discernable legislative intent is present, Morton mandates the 
"correction of error" standard, stating: 
[W]hen legislative intent concerning the specific question and issue can be 
derived through traditional methods of statutory construction, the agency's 
interpretation will be granted no deference and the statute will be 
interpreted in accord with its legislative intent. 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589, emphasis added. 
Accordingly, under Morton, the Commission's conclusions of law must be reviewed 
under the correction-of-error standard. 
H. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS NOT SUSTAINABLE 
UNDER EITHER STANDARD 
In this and its opening Brief, Arco demonstrated that the Use Tax assessed by the 
Commission is contrary to the prior opinions of this Court and the legislative intent of 
the statute. As "[governmental agencies cannot deprive the courts of their judicial 
functions nor can the agencies extend the operation of the statute by administrative 
regulations" {Utah Concrete Products, at 412), the Commission's Decision is clearly 
unreasonable, and therefore cannot be sustained even under the partial deference 
"reasonableness" standard sought by the Commission. 
4
 The opening brief regarding the Church addressed the relevance of ownership at 26-27, 
and the inapplicability of the Use Tax to materials not purchased either outside Utah or in 
interstate commerce at 21-23. 
£ 
Hereafter, this brief will establish that the Commission's Brief misidentifies the 
issues, is internally inconsistent and misinterprets the cited authorities. This brief will 
also show that the Decision is contrary to the language of the statute, the Commission's 
own Administrative Rules, and is discriminatory in operation. These additional factors 
reinforce the inescapable conclusion that the Commission's Decision cannot be upheld 
even under the deferential standard of review the Commission wishes to apply. 
m. THIS CASE TURNS ON THE SCOPE OF THE USE TAX AND NOT ON 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTIONS AS THE COMMISSION ASSERTS 
Part III of the Commission's Brief characterizes this case as involving a simple 
construction of the exemptions available to the Church and Granite under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104. (T.C.Br. Argument III at 23-26.) Using this characterization, the 
Commission argues that because this case involves construction of an exemption, all 
doubts should be resolved against Arco pursuant to Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980). 
To determine whether the interpretation of an exemption is involved, it is first 
necessary to ascertain whether the vendors sold the materials to Arco or to the exempt 
entities. If the materials were sold to Arco, Arco is liable for a Sales Tax since Arco 
has never claimed that it is entitled to an exemption on any of the materials it 
purchased.5 However, not only does taxation of Arco as the purchaser not involve 
interpretation of the scope of an exemption, it is also contrary to the language of the 
5
 When Arco itself purchased materials used in the contract it recognized that there was no 
exemption and paid the Sales Tax thereon. There was no tax deficiency assessed or disputed as 
to those materials. 
Decision which did not find Arco subject to a Sales Tax. What the Decision ultimately 
concluded was that Arco "was the real property contractor for those materials and 
pursuant to Rule 865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on those materials." (Reiterated 
verbatim with respect to both Granite and the Church, Gen. Docs. R.100, 102, 
emphasis added.) That conclusion demonstrates that the Commission did not find Arco 
to be the purchaser. 
Instead, the Commission found that, although the materials were purchased by the 
exempt entities, Arco is nevertheless subject to a Use Tax because "conversion of 
tangible personal property into real property is deemed to be the consumption or use 
of the tangible personal property, which is the taxable event." (T.C.Br, at 25, quoting 
Gen. Docs. R. 93, emphasis added.) This conclusion obviously results from construing 
the scope of the Use Tax, rather than from determining the limits of an exemption to 
the sales tax. 
The scope of the exemptions is irrelevant to Arco because if the exempt entities 
fail to qualify for an exemption, it would result on a tax to them and not on Arco. 
Thus, regardless of who is determined to be the purchaser, taxation of Arco does not 
depend upon the scope of an exemption. When not construing an exemption, the 
correct rule of law is that all doubts about the scope of the statute must be liberally 
construed in the potential taxpayer's favor. See Pacific lntermountain Express Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958), citing with approval 
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). 
8 
IV. INSTALLING THE CHURCH'S PROPERTY CANNOT 
SUBJECT ARCO TO A USE TAX 
The Commission's primary argument is that personal property should be taxed 
some time prior to its incorporation into realty. (See T.C.Br. 25, 27.) The 
Commission therefore ruled that Arco is subject to a Use Tax, alleging that converting 
personalty to realty subjects the entity physically attaching the property to a Use Tax as 
the "consumer" of such property. (T.C.Br, at 25; Gen.Docs.R. 93.) This position is 
insupportable because it is contrary to legislative intent and the language of the statute 
which requires ownership as discussed above and in the prior brief. (Ch.Br. at 15.) 
Another fundamental error of the Commission's approach is that it ignores the 
mechanics of the Sales Tax and both the mechanics and purpose of the Use Tax as a 
complement to the Sales Tax. The proper way to analyze the scope of the Sales and 
Use Taxes was set forth by this Court in Union Pacific where, as here, the Commission 
asserted a Use Tax on personal property attached to realty. This Court rejected the 
Commission's contention that use, storage, or consumption of material in this state is 
always a taxable event allowing taxation of the increases in value to the materials 
obtained through out-of-state services, and confirmed that purchases within this state 
which are not amenable to the Sales Tax are not thereafter subject to the Use Tax. 
The Court began its analysis as follows: 
In order to analyze this claim, we must first examine the Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act (the "Act") and distinguish between the sales tax component 
and the use tax component of the Act. The Commission's rules differentiate 
the two . . . 
Id., at 15. 
After analyzing Utah Admin. R. 865-19-1S, this Court first explained, then 
reiterated, the application of the Sales Tax and the Use Tax as follows: 
To recapitulate, the sales tax imposes a transaction tax on certain sales and 
certain services that occur in Utah. Complementing the Sales Tax, the Use Tax 
imposes an excise tax on tangible property and certain services performed in 
connection with that property, where the property is stored or used in Utah but is 
not subject to the Utah Sales Tax because it was purchased or the service was 
performed outside of Utah. 
The Act permits the state to tax "retail sales of tangible personal property made 
within the state." certain enumerated services rendered within the state, and in-
state storage, use or consumption of tangible property purchased outside the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103. 
Id. at 16-17, emphasis added. 
When the Sales Tax is separated from the Use Tax according to the above 
instructions, it becomes apparent that both taxes have a "transactional" nature as well 
as geographic limits. Moreover, this Court said the "proper focus is . . .on the 
transactions that actually took place, whether inside or outside Utah, and the taxability 
of each transaction. Id. at 18. Acting as complementary taxes, both taxes are assessed 
against the "purchaser" (who by clear implication must be the owner, see Utah Concrete 
Products) on the amount paid to acquire title at the time of sale, Le.9 when title 
transfers.6 It follows that Arco cannot be subject to a Use Tax on material it doesn't 
own, and because the materials stored and installed were not acquired out-of-state by 
6
 As a result of specific statutory language extending the scope of the taxes, they can also 
apply to the rendition of services or payments incident to a lease. However, since Union 
Pacific did not involve any leased property, this Court omitted references to leases from its 
discussion, presumably for convenience and clarity. This case does not involve either leases or 
taxable services, and therefore references to both leases and services are hereafter omitted for 
the same reasons of simplicity and clarity. 
10 
Arco.7 This Court's holding in Union Pacific alone is thus dispositive of the 
Commission's Use Tax arguments. 
It is therefore not surprising that the Commission has not cited a single Utah case 
in which the court decided either (1) that the act of attaching personalty to realty was 
itself a taxable event, or (2) that any tax due fell upon the entity making the 
attachment regardless of ownership. In every case assessing a tax on the party 
converting8 personalty to realty, the entity attaching the property was the owner, and 
the taxable transaction was the prior purchase, not the act of conversion. 
This Court addressed both issues, beginning with the ownership requirement, in 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 
1992), stating: 
[0]ne who purchases building materials for use in constructing homes, highways 
and the like, is a "real property contractor,1' and the contractor's purchases of 
tangible personal property used for such purposes are taxable transactions under 
the sales tax law. 
The term "real property contractor" is thus linked to purchasing, not merely 
attaching, the property. Moreover, as required by Union Pacific, the purchase is 
expressly stated to be the taxable transaction. Indeed, attachment (which comes after 
the purchase) is effectively disavowed as a taxable event because the tax applied is 
expressly stated to be a sales tax, and "purchases are the last transactions in which 
7
 At the hearing, it was assumed that all of the materials in question were purchased in 
Utah. However, materials purchased outside Utah by the Church cannot constitutionally be 
taxed to the Church in any event when similar purchases inside Utah are not taxed, {Union 
Pacific, at 17), and they cannot be separately taxed to Arco if Arco were not the purchaser. 
8
 Utah Concrete actually assessed the vendor which should have collected the tax from the 
buyers. 
those materials can be subjected to the sales tax." {Id. at 306, emphasis added.) It 
follows that under this definition the Church and Granite are the "real property 
contractors" and the only parties potentially subject to tax because they are the 
purchasers of the materials at issue. 
Interestingly, even the Colorado cases cited by the Commission reject application 
of the Use Tax to a party which only attaches the materials to realty. Howard 
Electrical v. Department of Revenue, 111 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1989), rejects the Commission's 
proposition that use of the materials is a separate taxable event from the purchase of 
the materials. In Howard Electrical, the Colorado Supreme Court stated: 
A Use Tax is considered supplementary to, not separate from, Sales Tax. 
Although [the plaintiff] contends that the Use Tax is a separate tax and should be 
viewed in isolation, only the most abstract legalistic approach can justify such an 
argument. We are aware of no court where such an artificial division of the tax 
scheme has been accepted in determining the effects of the Use Tax on 
commerce. 
Id., citing AA. Tobin Const. Co. v. Weed, 158 Colo. 430, 407 P.2d 350 (1965) (emphasis 
added, citations omitted.) 
Howard Electrical also approved without comment Tri-State Generation & 
Transmission Ass% Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 636 P.2d 1335 (Colo.App. 1981), which in 
turn set forth the following limitation to applying the Use Tax to contractors who don't 
own the building materials: 
[T]he owner who determines the nature and character of the structure is the one 
who uses all of the materials entering into the structure. If the owner does the 
work himself, there can be no question as to who used the material. When he 
engages another to erect the structure the act of making the improvement is still 
his act. Such materials as he puts into the work are used by the one directing 
and controlling it. 
Id. at 1337, quoting Fifteenth Street Investment Co. v. People, 102 Colo. 571, 81 P.2d 764 
(1938). This statement is particularly strong since, although Colorado's Use Tax statute 
(which taxes "every person" instead of "purchasers") is not predicated upon ownership, 
the court nevertheless refused to assess a tax against a mere contractor. 
V. ARCO DID NOT PURCHASE THE CHANGE ORDER MATERIALS 
Historically, this Court has stated that the Sales Tax accrues upon transfer of title 
or possession. See Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 719 
(Utah 1990). In a recent case where taxability of shipping charges hinged upon when 
title passed this Court found that the parties were free to govern title passage through 
written agreements. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc., v. State Tax Comm% 200 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 3 (Nov. 12, 1992). 
The legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(8) to exempt charities from 
tax on materials they purchase in connection with their charitable activities. Utah 
Admin. R. 865-19-43S embodies this exemption by stating that: "All sales to or by 
religious . . . institutions in the conduct of their regular religious . . . functions are 
not subject to sales tax." This rule does not permit the Commission to expressly 
revoke the exemption for building materials based on whether or not the church is a 
contractor. Neither should the Commission be allowed to defeat legislative intent by 
refusing to recognize the right of the Church to elect to buy its own building materials. 
The Commission has offered no justification for why the parties to a construction 
contract should not be able to freely elect (and from time to time change their election 
if it suits their purposes) which entity is to be the purchaser of the materials, or why 
this Court should not give credence to such elections in the same manner that Hales 
allowed the point of delivery to be freely changed by agreement. 
There is precedent for allowing the parties such freedom. In Ford I Twaits Co. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm% 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944), this Court looked solely 
to who paid the vendor and when title passed to the government in concluding that, 
because the contractor paid the vendor and then took title before transferring the 
material to the government, the exemption granted to the government did not apply.9 
However, the Court also said: 
Had it so intended, it would have been a simple matter to authorize plaintiff 
to buy as an agent of the government, to issue a tax exemption certificate 
referred to in Article 31 of the contract, or otherwise declare the goods 
government property. 
(Twaits, at 344.) In this case, the Church clearly intended to purchase the disputed 
materials, the Church ordered the materials (Gen.Docs. R. 81, T.C.Br. H 16, p. 11), 
paid for them (Gen.Docs. R. 82, T.C.Br. H 20, p. 12), and title passed directly from the 
vendor to the Church. (Gen.Docs. R. 82, T.CBr. If 21, Pg. 12.) Thus every criteria 
expressed in Twaits is present here. In the instant case, all of these traditional 
determinants of ownership, together with several other incidents listed by the courts 
cited in the Commission's Brief, show that the Church and Granite owned the 
construction materials at issue. 
9
 The Tax Commission has also promulgated Utah Admin. R. 865-19-42S, which bases the 
determination of whether the governmental entity is the purchaser solely upon whether the 
governmental entity issued payment for the property. Although the Church does not come 
strictly under this rule, there is no reason why payment by the Church should have any less 
relevance. 
1 A 
As noted, the Commission concluded that applicability of the tax depended upon 
who was the actual contractor. In support of its claim that Arco was the contractor 
and thus subject to taxation, the Commission announced a list of special criteria to 
determine which party was responsible for affixing the building materials. The 
Commission then decided that Arco should be subject to the Use Tax based on duties 
necessarily incident to the general contractor and its subcontractors receiving the 
materials as bailees. Because the statute places the tax on the "purchaser," the 
Commission was forced to characterize what amounts to "incidents of bailment" as "the 
most significant 'incidents of ownership'." (T.C.Br, at 29.) However, there is no 
necessity for using a special list of factors beyond those set forth in Twaits for 
identifying the purchaser, and there is good reason to believe the Commission did not 
fashion its list of factors for this purpose. 
To begin with, identification of the entity receiving property from a vendor can 
have substantial unintended ramifications in the context of determining whether a 
transaction is taxable in Utah as a sale, and the probable legislative intent is that the 
threshold for having taxable sales should be as low as possible. 
Second, the Commission's list of factors for identifying the contractor is not 
suitable as an indicator of ownership because it confuses the duties of a bailee with the 
burdens and benefits of ownership. In this case, there were four classes of materials 
which the Church purchased and turned over to Interwest to be incorporated into the 
building. (Ch.Br. at 6, 7.) It was undisputed that the Church was the purchaser and 
owner of the first three classes, and that Interwest and Arco were mere bailees. Yet 
Arco had exactly the same duties with respect to all four classes of materials. (Ch.Tr. 
p 53 In 1-21.) There is simply no justification, and the Commission offers none, for 
applying different standards on only one class of those materials. 
Third, the Commission's use of a complex list of factors without guidance as to 
how those factors are to be weighed and applied has made it impossible for taxpayers 
to understand their duties under the Decision, particularly since the factors include 
events which may occur long after the potentially taxable transfer is completed. 
Indeed, the Commission itself seems to have trouble in interpreting its own rule 
when it argues in one sentence that ,f[h]ere, as in [Twaits] the 'contractor' [Interwest] is 
the party 'storing, using and consuming' the materials;11 then in the next sentence states 
that Arco was the "subcontractor" through which the "contractor" made its conversion; 
and finally in the third sentence says that the tax should fall on Arco because it was 
the entity "storing or using the property." (T.C.Br, at 21.) Thus, two sentences say the 
tax falls on Interwest as the contractor, and the very next sentence says the tax falls on 
Arco. This was the very confusion objected to on pages 28-30 of Arco's Brief 
regarding the Church-related assessment. That objection, and several others showing 
defects in the Commission's Decision, were ignored in the Commission's Response 
Brief, however. This is precisely the kind of inconsistency which makes the Decision 
unreasonable in law and unworkable in practice. 
Finally, in both the Decision and the Commission's Brief, it is clear that each 
deals with the "burdens and benefits of ownership" only in a Use Tax context of 
determining which party was responsible for affixing the materials to the real property. 
1 * 
The Decision fails to give any weight to the significant burdens of an owner other those 
of a bailee during construction. If the Decision were trying to determine who 
"purchased" the materials in the ordinary sense, it would have specifically focused on 
the relationship of the parties to the vendors to see who was the buyer, looking 
primarily to issues like passage of title, payment, privity of contract, warranties and 
bidding based on the credit worthiness of the buyer. It would also have weighed issues 
not directly related to installation such as insurance, final selection of materials, liability 
for unsuitable materials, right to remove materials, rights to surplus materials and 
changes in financing and retainage. It didn't.10 Instead, the Decision focused on the 
handling and control of the materials during the construction process to see who was 
the contractor. In addition, the Decision qualified its conclusion to indicate that it was 
only considering the construction process itself by saying: 
[T]he LDS Church did not have substantial involvement in the project, or with 
the materials, during the construction process. The general contractor and the 
subcontractors had nearly total control of and responsibility for the materials 
during the construction process. . . . Petitioner [Arco] installed those materials 
into the project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming the risks, 
burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership during the construction 
process. Therefore, . . . [Arco] converted those materials from tangible personal 
property into real property. Therefore, [Arco] was the real property contractor 
for those materials and pursuant to Rule 865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on 
those materials. 
(Decision at 35-37; Gen.Docs. R. 100-102, emphasis added.) Moreover, the Decision 
10
 The Decision did mention some of these factors in passing, but gave no clue as to how 
these factors were weighted or their relative significance. However, before listing the factors 
the Commission qualified its view of their relevance not by saying the review was to determine 
who was the purchaser, but by saying the review was to see "whether or not the exempt 
organization exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials." (Gen.Docs. R.91.) The 
concepts of "person who attached" and "purchaser" are far too distinct for an inquiry directed at 
determining the former to shed meaningful light on the identity of the latter. 
specifically applied a Use Tax to Arco, showing that it did not intend to assess the tax 
based upon the transfer from the vendor since that would have resulted in a Sales Tax. 
The Commission's Brief also reflects that the incidents of ownership are intended 
to apply only in the context of determining the identity of the contractor under the 
Commission's theory of the Use Tax. The brief erronously states: 
This court's interpretation of "use" in Interwest [Interwest Aviation v. County Board 
of Equalization, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987)] and the Tax Commission's application 
of that principle in the instant case are consistent with the definition contained in 
§ 59-12-102(14). That definition does not require "ownership" of the property in 
order to impose a use tax. The basis of a taxable use is the exercise of a legal 
right over the property, whether that right is granted by title, lease, or contract. 
. . . In this case, Arco's contract created both legal rights and duties concerning 
the materials. As found by the Tax Commission, those contractual rights and 
duties placed the significant "incidents of ownership" on Arco. Therefore, the 
Commission properly found that Arco's use of the material was taxable. 
(T.C.Br, at 30-31, emphasis added.) Note that the Commission Brief states the 
relevant rights were created by the contract, not by a purchase from the vendor. 
In addition to other errors discussed above, this passage reaffirms the fact that 
the Commission's Decision is based on a misreading of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102(14), which says the use must be incident to "ownership or the leasing" - not by 
"title, lease or contract" as the Commission claims. In short, the Commission's 
statement is patently incorrect. Since no lease is involved, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102(14) clearly requires ownership. 
The Commission also cites Interwest Aviation as not requiring ownership. 
Reliance upon Interwest Aviation appears entirely misplaced, as it concerned property 
tax rather than sales or use tax, with concomitantly different public policies. The 
Commission cites Interwest Aviation for its indication that legal title may be disregarded 
for purposes of property tax assessment. However, the Commission fails to address the 
underlying reasons and elements considered in reaching that determination. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the subject properties are used for religious and 
government purposes, and any tax imposed will be paid by the religious and 
government entities. Clearly, this is different from the circumstances underlying the 
property tax determination. Moreover, if the Commission wishes to rely upon Interwest 
Aviation for an incidents-of-ownership test, it must also accept Interwest Aviation's 
discussion of that principle. The Court looked at eight incidents of ownership, saying: 
Significantly, (1) the plaintiffs built their own improvements from their own 
plans, (2) they had full use and enjoyment of, and profit from, the 
improvements, (3) they paid no rent for the improvements that year, (4) 
they maintained the improvements completely at their own cost, (5) they 
took a depreciation deduction for 1982 in their federal income tax returns 
and the leases lowed them to depreciate fully the cost of improvements for 
federal income tax purposes, (6) they provided and maintained all necessary 
insurance coverage to protect the property and the city, (7) they expressly 
agreed to pay Possession and Use Taxes on the improvements, and (8) they 
could remove the improvements if the city defaulted on its obligations. 
Id. at 1226-1227. 
To the extent that any of these criteria is applicable to the instant case, it would 
indicate that ownership is in the Church and/or Granite. Although there is no 
contention by the Church that it was responsible for actually affixing the personal 
property to the realty, virtually all other factors recognized by this Court in Interwest 
Aviation are present: (1) the exempt entities required the improvements to be built 
according to their own plans, (2) the exempt entities used and profited from the 
improvements, (3) Arco never occupied the improvements in a way that could make 
them subject to rent, (4) the exempt entities maintained the improvements after 
completion, completely at the exempt entity's cost, (5) Arco took no depreciation for 
the properties, (6) the exempt entities provided the insurance coverage during the 
construction period, (7) the exempt entities agreed to pay any Sales or Use Taxes 
imposed, and (8) Arco could not remove the improvements even if the entities 
defaulted in their contractual obligations. 
Application of the eight incidents of ownership, looked to by the court in Interwest 
Aviation, none of which involved who attached personally to realty, plainly indicates the 
Church and Granite are the owners. Under the principles of that case, therefore, the 
tax would not fall on Arco. 
Finally, even if the Commission did mean to adopt a list of factors for deter-
mining ownership, this Court is not bound by such action. The legislative intent of the 
statute is better served by allowing exempt entities reasonable access to the exemptions 
the legislature adopted to implement public policy. This is best accomplished by 
looking at the limited factors of Twaits and Utah Admin. R. 865-19-42S. 
VL THE COMMISSION'S DECISION REPRESENTS AN ABRUPT AND 
UNWARRANTED REVERSAL OF WELL-ESTABLISHED POLICY 
The Commission asserts that its current position has been clearly established law 
since 1942. (T.C.Br, at 20-23.) The Commission fails to explain, however, why the 
practices and policies at issue had been used for years and become widespread (Ch. 
Brief at 9), and why -- by its own admission - the Commission itself has allowed the 
practice for many years, and even had auditors opine as to its acceptability (Gen.Docs. 
R. 71 HIT 24-27). The fact that the Commission is admittedly reversing its own long-
standing interpretation (Ch. Brief at 24, Ch.Tr. p.94 In. 10-21) again demonstrates the 
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unreasonableness of the Commission's position, particularly when the reason given at 
the hearing for the changes was simply the desire for more revenue. (Ch.Tr., Add. Ex. 
4, p 91 In 20 through p 92 In 22.) 
VH. THE CHANGE ORDERS ALTERED THE PARTIES' POSITIONS 
As noted in Arco's opening brief, the change orders altered the parties' 
contractual duties. In response to this contention, the Commission argues that the 
change orders were of no effect, citing an isolated portion of contractual language for 
that proposition. Again, however, the Commission reads the critical language 
incorrectly. A brief look at the language quoted on page 34 of the Commission's Brief 
shows that the language which requires work to be done "under the original conditions 
and terms" applies only to additional work. The change orders at issue in this case 
deleted the contractual obligation to furnish certain materials. Similarly, the language 
about not relieving the contractor "of any of its duties or obligations" can only be read 
as referring to duties or obligations other than to supply materials which the parties 
have subsequently agreed the Church would furnish. Otherwise it produces a contract 
in which "changes make no changes," an absurd result. If the quoted language were 
construed in this way, and if nothing else were considered, which is the Commission's 
approach, this language would have required the contractor to purchase and provide a 
duplicate of all Change Order Materials. This was not what the parties understood, 
intended or did. Even if the Commission is correct as to the meaning of the quoted 
language as of the date the contract was signed, the parties plainly intended the 
Change Orders to amend the contract. Such intent was legally effective since the 
Change Orders were all executed subsequent to the execution of the contract, and 
therefore superseded the original language. Thus the Change Orders had the effect of 
relieving the contractors (including Arco) of the duty to supply the Change Order 
Materials . 
Instead of looking at isolated snips of language taken out of context, this Court 
should do as the Commission requests earlier in its brief and interpret the contract 
based upon "economic reality" (T.C. Br. at 29-30), with regard for both the dealings 
between the parties and the course of dealing in the industry where these arrangements 
were well understood and widely utilized. (Gr.Tr., pp.18-19, 137, 168-9; Ch.Tr., p.47.) 
Vffl. THE COMMISSION APPLIES THE LAW INCONSISTENTLY 
In Union Pacific, the Commission determined that because the formula used in 
Union Pacific's tax calculations was a long-standing practice, imposing taxes for prior 
years would be retroactive lawmaking. The practice of using change orders was also of 
longstanding duration and used by many exempt entities and many contractors over a 
number of years. When the Commission applies changes to other taxpayers only 
prospectively, application of this change to Arco retroactively is arbitrary, capricious 
and unfairly discriminatory. If this Court upholds the taxability of the property 
purchased by the exempt organizations, such change should be applied prospectively 
only, consistent with the Commission's treatment of Union Pacific. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjustified by statute 
or case law under either standard of review. This Court should therefore refuse to 
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extend the Use Tax to reach materials sold within Utah, and hold that where an 
exempt entity directly pays for tangible personal property and title to the property is 
transferred directly to the exempt entity pursuant to a contract with the vendor (except, 
of course, where the vendor attaches the property to realty as part of the transaction), 
the sale is to the exempt entity and free from Sales Tax under Utah Admin. Rules 865-
19-58S.A.4, 865-19-43S.A and 865-19-42S. The Court should then apply that rule of 
law to the undisputed facts of this case and dismiss the deficiency against Arco. 
If the court finds otherwise, the court should articulate a new standard which is 
capable of being administered, and apply the decision prospectively only with a 
corresponding dismissal of the instant deficiency against Arco. 
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